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“Economic rationales for the design of health care financing 
schemes” 
 





In this paper we investigate the economic rationales for the design of health 
care financing arrangements. We propose a categorization of financing 
schemes based on a distinction between basic and supplementary services 
and between mandatory and voluntary coverage. We argue that the most 
important economic arguments for governments to enforce a system of cross-
subsidies that guarantees the financial access to a predefined set of basic 
services to high-risk or low-income individuals are the presence of 
externalities in health care services consumption; the individuals’ risk of 
becoming bad risks; and the moral hazard effects induced by cross-
subsidization. In addition, we argue that the rationale for mandatory coverage 
is based on considerations of free riding behaviour, individuals’ lack of 
foresight and too high transaction costs of alternative ways to organize cross-
subsidies. 
Finally, we will discuss the implications of our analysis for the design of 
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In general, health care financing schemes may be distinguished according to 
the type of services (basic or supplementary) and the type of coverage 
(mandatory or voluntary) they provide. The structure of these schemes differs 
substantially across countries and it has been exposed to several changes 
throughout the years. In particular, different countries in different times may 
categorize services and coverage differently. For example, dental care and 
physiotherapy are currently considered as basic services in some countries 
(e.g. Germany) and in others not (e.g. Switzerland). Or they once were 
considered as basic services but not nowadays (e.g. the Netherlands). 
Countries may also differ in the speed with which new therapies and 
pharmaceuticals are considered as basic services and whether to impose 
mandatory coverage. The political decisions about which services should be 
considered as basic and whether coverage should be mandatory may change 
in time (time-dependent) and differ across diverse communities or countries 
(community-dependent).  
In most countries, the decisions concerning the categorization of services and 
coverage are based on a number of “implicit” value judgments. For instance, 
society’s choice regarding the inclusion or exclusion of services in the basic 
basket2 implicitly involves judgments about individuals’ willingness to 
participate in a system of cross-subsidies (solidarity) that aims at 
guaranteeing financial access for the majority of the population. In the 
following sections, the focus is not on the ethical or political aspects of such 
“implicit” judgments, but rather on the set of economic arguments that may 
underlie these judgments. For this purpose, a general framework is developed 
that analyses the main economic rationales underlying the political choice of 
categorizing services in basic and supplementary and coverage in mandatory 
and voluntary. In particular, the following question is addressed: 
 
• What can be the economic arguments for categorizing health care services 
in basic and supplementary, and coverage in mandatory and voluntary? 
                                                
2 The basic basket (or package) represents the totality of basic services.  
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In the categorization of health care services other criteria may also be 
advocated such as legal, historical (i.e. path dependency), and political (i.e. 
pressure groups) etc., however here the focus is on the economic rationales.  
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide the main 
definitions adopted in the conceptual framework and throughout the thesis. 
Section 3 and 4 deal with the economic arguments for governments to 
categorize services in basic and supplementary, and coverage in mandatory 




2. Defining health care financing schemes 
The great variety of definitions used in the literature (see for example 
Colombo, 2004) to describe the diverse health care financing arrangements in 
different countries requires some preliminary clarification. We envisage two 
essential dimensions for defining different health care financing 
arrangements: 1) the type of services and 2) the type of coverage they provide. 
By services we mean health care goods and services,3 and by coverage we 
refer to the guarantee of financial access to predefined health care services. 
Coverage may be either in-kind or in-cash. 
In this thesis, we distinguish between basic and supplementary services, and 
between mandatory and voluntary coverage. Historically in most countries 
the crucial element of distinction between basic and supplementary services 
has been cross-subsidization. Therefore, basic services4 are defined as the set 
of health care services for which the government guarantees the financial 
access for the high risk and/or low income groups, by enforcing a system of 
cross-subsidies from low to high risk groups or from high to low income 
                                                
3 In insurance the term benefits is widely adopted in the literature to refer to health care 
services and goods. Throughout this thesis the term benefits is sometimes preferred, 
particularly when referring to services provided by insurance schemes or contracts. 
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groups.5 Supplementary services are defined as the set of health services that 
do not fulfill the conditions for being considered as basic. 
Then, the term basic health insurance (BHI) refers to schemes that provide 
coverage to basic health care services within a certain Society. Supplementary 
health insurance (SHI) refers to those schemes covering supplementary 
services, which are by definition excluded from BHI.  
We define mandatory coverage if the government imposes on consumers a 
legal obligation to obtain coverage. By contrast, we refer to voluntary 
coverage when people are free to decide for which services to cover. 
Restrictions on choice of coverage as a result of employment-based group 
contracts do not fall under the scope of our definition of mandatory 
coverage, since these restrictions are not the result of government 
regulation.   
Then, the term mandatory health insurance (MHI) refers to schemes that 
provide mandatory coverage for either basic or supplementary services. In 
case these services are basic we refer to mandatory basic health insurance, if 
they are supplementary we refer to mandatory supplementary health 
insurance. In case there is no legal obligation set by the government limiting 
consumers’ choice of coverage, we are in presence of voluntary health 
insurance (VHI), which may provide coverage for either basic or 
supplementary services (see Table 1). 
(Table 1 about here)   
 
 
Table 1. Defining health insurance schemes.  
                                                                                                                                       
4 It is implicitly assumed that individuals are in need of the health care service, on the basis of 
a specific medical indication or range of diagnosis. 
5 Subsidies may be allocated to finance directly basic services’ provision or to finance the 
coverage for these services. Health care systems, in which subsidies are allocated to finance 
directly the purchase of basic services’ provision, are usually identified as National Health 
Insurance or Service (NHI or NHS) schemes. In case the subsidies finance the purchase of 







3. Categorizing services in basic and supplementary 
In most societies individuals appear to be willing to support a system of cross-
subsidies that guarantees the financial access to basic services for the high 
risks and/or the low income groups. In order to assure the existence and the 
functioning of the cross-subsidy system government intervention may be 
required. For instance, governments’ enforcement of a mandatory cross-
subsidy system may be necessary to prevent that some individuals free ride 
on the contributions by others.6 In this section, we discern the main economic 
                                                
6 Theoretically, government intervention would not be necessary if the individuals’ 
willingness to cross-subsidize overwhelms the incentives for free riding. Empirical evidence 
concerning the importance of the free rider problem in public good provision is not 
conclusive. The results from a study by Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) seem fairly typical. On 



















































arguments for governments to enforce a system of cross-subsidies that 
guarantees the financial access to basic services for the high risks and/or the 
low income groups. In particular, we distinguish and discuss the following 
economic arguments: the presence of externalities in the demand for some 
health care services (section 3.1.), the individual’s risk of becoming a high risk 
(section 3.2.), and the moral hazard effect induced by cross-subsidization 
(section 3.3.).  
   
 
3.1. Externalities 
For some goods and services, including many forms of medical treatment, 
consumers may be willing to pay for the consumption by others. A reason for 
this is that the consumption of health care services produces external effects. 
Externalities arise when a consumption (production) activity of one set of 
individuals affects the utility functions of other individuals, while this effect is 
not included in the individuals’ utility functions. In other words, externalities 
occur when the activities of an individual produce results that affect others 
but are not taken into account by those who produce them. Externalities can 
be both positive and negative. Positive (negative) externalities occur when 
actions of one set of individuals make other individuals better (worse) off, yet 
the first set neither bear the costs nor receive the benefits of doing so (Gruber, 
2005). The external effects generated by an individual’s non-consumption of 
health care services’ are mainly the consequence of two types of interpersonal 
preferences: altruistic and egoistic preferences. The literature (Culyer & 
Simpson, 1980; van Doorslaer & Schut, 1999) tracks down a third type of 
interpersonal preferences so-called paternalistic preferences. Since the only 
                                                                                                                                       
average, people contribute only a portion of their resources to the provision of the public 
good, suggesting the existence of some free riding. On the other hand, the results contradict 
purely calculating behaviour in which case free riding would lead to zero or trivial amounts 
of a public good. Two other important results are that the more people repeat the game, the 
less likely they are to contribute, and that the contribution rates decline when the opportunity 
cost of giving goes up. Brunner (1998) found evidence suggesting the existence of a subset of 
public goods for which an increase in the number of users does not decrease the users’ 
willingness to contribute to the financing of that good.     
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difference between paternalistic and altruistic preferences is in the extent and 
the focus of an individual’s concern about others, we simply distinguish 
between two types of altruistic preferences. We refer to type-1 altruistic 
preferences if an individual’s concern is about others’ general wellbeing and to 
type-2 altruistic preferences if an individual concerns specifically about 
others’ health status.7 
 
 
3.1.1. Altruistic preferences8 
A first important consumption externality in health care is the presence of 
type-1 altruistic preferences that is an individual’s concern about the 
wellbeing of others. Thus, individuals’ concern about others’ well-being 
generates an altruistic externality which calls for subsidization. Type-1 
altruistic preferences may undertake a very general form of interpersonal 
dependencies. For instance, the interpersonal utility function for individual B 
may look like the following:  
 
UB= UB (HB, UA[HA (MA), CA], CB) 
 
The utility of B is in this case a direct function of the utility of individual A 
and therefore of A’s health status (HA) and health care consumption (CA). An 
important implication of this model is that B respects the preferences of A. For 
example, if A prefers other goods (CA) over health or health care, than B may 
also be willing to pay for A’s consumption of these other goods (CA). 
Therefore, A freely chooses, based on his/her own preferences, whether to 
consume medical care (MA) or other goods (CA). A financial transfer of income 
                                                
7 The social concern for the distribution of the use of health care services may be based on 
viewing medical care as involving good-specific altruism (Diamond, 1992) or commodity-
egalitarism (Evans, 1978). 
8 In this paper, we do not deal with the question: what determines altruism? This question has 
given rise to an entire field of study of social capital, the value of altruistic and communal 
behaviour in society. A central finding of this field is that individuals are likely to be more 
altruistic when they are more “trusting” others. Anderson et al. (2003) found that most of the 
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(lump sum) from B to A would appear to be the simplest transaction in order 
to increase A’s utility.9  
Alternatively, an individual’s concern about others may not be focused on 
others’ general wellbeing but specifically on their health status (type-2 
altruistic preferences). In other words, an individual may prefer to contribute 
to improvements in others’ health status rather than others’ general welfare 
(Arrow, 1963; Reinhardt, 1998). In this case, type-2 altruistic preferences may 
be expressed by the following interpersonal utility function for individual B:  
 
UB= UB (HB, HA(MA), CB) 
 
The utility of B is a direct function of A’s health status (HA), therefore B’s 
willingness to subsidize limits itself to A’s medical consumption, in so far that 
it positively contributes to A’s health status. Possible interpersonal 
transactions, which could increase the utilities of both individuals, would 
have to be income- or risk-related subsidies earmarked to the consumption of 
specific services that positively contribute to health. Most people seem to be 
unwilling to deny effective care to other members of society.10 Presumably, an 
individual’s concern toward others’ health status does not only depend on the 
effectiveness of treatments, but also on the costs and the severity of the illness. 
For instance, in case of lifesaving interventions individuals may be willing to 
cross-subsidize the financial access of high-risk or low-income individuals to 
services or treatments, even if they are not particularly cost-effective. Thus, 
                                                                                                                                       
attitudinal and behavioural measures of trust were positively correlated with high 
contributions to merit or public goods.  
9 The problem with this “lump-sum solution” is the virtual impossibility of establishing 
lump-sum taxes and subsidies that do not affect incentives of either the payer of the tax or the 
recipient of the subsidy (Graff, 1971; Nath, 1969; Samuelson, 1947).   
10 Van den Berg et al. (1986) found evidence of the presence of strong altruistic preferences for 
medical care consumption in the Netherlands. From data of the 1985 Health Interview Survey 
by the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) they conclude that 78% of the 
representative sample population fully disagreed with the statement that ‘people with a less 
favorable health status should pay more for health care than people in good health’ (9% 
partially agreed, only 3% fully agreed and 10% had no opinion).  
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altruistic preferences may be stronger for some health care services than for 
others.  
Given the presence of altruistic preferences, an individual’s utility of 
supporting a system of cross-subsidies that guarantees the financial access to 
health care services by others may depend on various factors, such as the cost-
effectiveness of services, the initial health status, the expected cost of services 
per consumer, and the consumers’ responsibility for the incidence of the 
disease. Each of these factors will be discussed below.   
 
Cost-effectiveness of services  
Cost-effectiveness analyses (CEA) are usually indicated as the primary tools 
policy-makers adopt in deciding whether to include (or exclude) a service in 
the basket (Drummond et. al., 1997).11 In CEA the costs of alternative services 
are their health effect which may differ in magnitude between the alternative 
services. The results of a CEA are summarized by the cost-effectiveness (CE) 
ratio.12 The CE ratio compares the incremental cost of an intervention with the 
incremental health improvement attributable to the intervention. The health 
improvements of using the intervention are typically measured in quality-
adjusted life-years (QALYs) gained. Therefore, the CE ratio is usually 
expressed as a cost per QALY gained.13 The intervention with the relatively 
lower CE ratio is considered the most cost-effective. In other words, CE ratios 
                                                
11 An extensive literature review about CEA methodology may be found elsewhere (Hauck et 
al., 2003). Key problems include choice of a summary measure to capture other benefits 
important to patients and the public; non-comparability of the values elicited with different 
health state value elicitation instruments; generalizability of studies beyond the study setting 
or country; choice of target population receiving the intervention; accounting for uncertainty 
in measuring costs and outcomes; inability to account for the opportunity costs of the cost-
increasing element of new interventions; and the requirement to consider portfolios of 
programmes, rather than individual technologies. 
12 Let the subscripts 1 and 0 denote the intervention under study and the alternative to which 
it is compared, respectively. If C1 and C0 are the net present values of costs that result when 
the intervention and alternatives are used, and E1 and E0 their respective health outcomes, the 
incremental CE ratio is simply: CE ratio = (C1 - C0)/(E1 - E0). This ratio, which is a cost per unit 
incremental health effect, is often used as a measure of value. 
13 In many respects QALYs are analogous to life expectancy, but include interventions that 
improve quality of life even when they do not affect survival. Each year that an individual 
lives longer contributes an additional year to the life expectancy calculation. The amount that 
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indicate which health care services will provide health improvements most 
efficiently (i.e. at a lower cost) (Garber, 2000). 
The information provided by CE ratios may affect an individual’s utility of 
contributing to a system of cross-subsidies, since they allow comparisons 
among different services in terms of costs and effects (i.e. measured in 
QALYs). In particular, economically rational individuals with altruistic 
preferences maximize their utility by maximizing the effect of cross-subsidies 
on others’ health status. The effect of cross-subsidization on others’ health 
status increases with the cost-effectiveness of the treatment. The more cost-
effective the services are the more effective cross-subsidization on others’ 
health status is, and thereby the more the altruistic preferences of rational 
individuals are satisfied. All in all, the utility of a rational individual with 
altruistic preferences increases with the cost-effectiveness of health care 
services. The higher the cost-effectiveness of an intervention for a specified 
diagnosis, the higher an individual’s utility of contributing to a system of 




Initial health status 
For many decades, cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) has been commonly 
advocated as the prime economic method for priority setting. Despite the 
refinement of the technical and methodological issues arising from the use of 
economic evaluation in priority setting, decision makers continue to diverge 
frequently from the principles of economic evaluation (Stolk et al., 2002; and 
Goddard et al., 2006). In particular, cost-effectiveness information is not the 
only grounds on which individuals’ altruistic preferences are based, and 
thereby for governments to decide whether a certain service should be 
                                                                                                                                       
each additional year of life adds to QALYs, in contrast, is a preference weight or utility that 
takes a value between 0 (death) and 1 (best health imaginable). 
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considered basic or supplementary.14 For instance, in the case of lung- or 
heart-transplants, a relatively low cost-effectiveness does not appear to 
constitute a sufficient motivation to consider these services as supplementary 
in most countries. A parallel argument can be made for Viagra, which is not 
included in the basic basket of most countries despite its high cost-
effectiveness.  
Apparently, when it comes to assess whether and to what extent specific 
health care services generate altruistic externalities, other factors, besides cost-
effectiveness, such as the individuals’ initial health status have to be 
considered.15 The basic hypothesis of the initial health status approach 
presented here is that an increase in an individual’s utility produced by an 
improvement of a given size in others’ health status is greater the lower the 
patient’s initial health status (Figure 1 about here).  
 
                                                
14 Also Goddard et al. (2006) argue that despite the refinement of the technical and 
methodological issues arising from the use of economic evaluation in priority setting, 
decision makers continue to diverge frequently from the principles of economic evaluation. 
15 Although related to the argument of individuals’ initial health status, the concepts of 
severity of illness (Nord et al., 1999), fair inning (Williams, 1997) and proportional shortfall 
(Johannesson, 2001; Stolk, 2004) will not be discussed, since they do not explicitly refer to the 
variation in an individual’s utility of supporting a system of cross-subsidies generated by an 
improvement in others’ health status or quality of life. 
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In general, an individual’s marginal utility of his or her “own” health is likely 
to decrease as his or her “own” health status improves i.e. an improvement on 
an individual’s “own” health status increases his or her “own” utility more 
the lower his or her “own” health status. This is also likely to hold for the 
marginal utility of “other’s” health. The assumption of decreasing marginal 
utility of “other’s” health implies that for equal improvements on A’s health 
status (HA1- HA0= H’A1- H’A0), the difference in B’s utility decreases the higher 
is A’s initial health status (U’B1- U’B0 < UB1- UB0). More precisely: 
 δ UB 
(HA) 





Therefore, the assumption of decreasing marginal utility of “other’s” health 
implies that an individual’s marginal utility of supporting a system of cross-
subsidies that guarantees the financial access to specific services is greater the 
lower others’ initial health status. Everything equal, the poorer the initial 
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health status (measured in QALYs) of a patient, the more the effect of cross-
subsidies is satisfying an individual’s altruistic preferences.  
In current CEA, health improvements (i.e. gains in QALYs) produced by 
consumption of health care services are weighed equally regardless the initial 
health status of patients. Thus, only the number of QALYs gained determines 
priority, while in a decision-making process of a rational altruistic individual 
QALYs that are gained by people with a lower initial health status may be 
given more weight. For instance, patients eligible for a lung transplant 
normally are in such poor health states (in Figure 1 closer to 0 on the X axis, 
i.e. HA0), that altruistic individuals may find it acceptable to cross-subsidize 
the high cost per QALY in order to provide patients with a ‘last resort 
medicine’. This phenomenon may be especially pronounced for lifesaving 
interventions. In contrast, erectile dysfunction is generally considered to be a 
minor health problem. Since it generally occurs to people with good health 
status (in Figure 1 HA1, i.e. high initial health status), the QALY gains 
produced by Viagra, which is a cost-effective treatment, would receive a 
relatively low weight. Note that in specific patient groups such as patients 
with erectile dysfunction due to spinal cord injuries, this argument does not 
hold, since these patients’ initial health status is low. Therefore, a rational 
altruistic individual may be willing to cross-subsidize the low cost per QALY 
of Viagra to patients with a diagnosed erectile dysfunction due to spinal cord 
injuries. 
In deciding whether or for which diagnosis a service may be classified as 
basic or supplementary, the use of weights that consider the cost-effectiveness 
of services and the initial health status of patients would reflect the 





The expected cost of services per consumer 
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A rational and altruistic individual’s utility of supporting a system of cross-
subsidies may also be affected by the expected costs of health care services 
faced by others. Being all other things equal, the lower the expected cost of 
services per consumer the weaker the effect of cross-subsidies is likely to be in 
satisfying an individual’s altruistic preferences. In general, a system of cross-
subsidies satisfies an individual’s altruistic preferences, and thereby it 
produces a welfare gain, in so far that it increases the financial access to 
otherwise unaffordable care (Nyman, 2003). Whether and to what extent 
health care is un-affordable may vary across individuals, and it depends in 
particular on their available income (or total wealth). For instance, if services 
involve low utilization rate and are relatively cheap (i.e. Paracetamol), an 
individual may not be willing to cross-subsidize people who need them, 
given that these services may be easily accessed without constituting an 
excessive financial burden on each consumer. Nevertheless, there always are 
individual consumers for whom even low prices or volumes are hard to 
sustain autonomously, and the absence of subsidies may cause differences in 
health care use. These differences may generate altruistic externalities for 
some health care services, and thus call for subsidies.  
Ceteris paribus, the higher the expected price and volume of medical care per 
consumer, the greater an individual’s utility of contributing to a system of 





Consumer’s responsibility for the incidence of the disease 
Another factor that may influence an individual’s willingness to support a 
system of cross-subsidies can be derived from a consumer’s responsibility in 
originating the condition for which services are demanded. Consider the case 
of health care expenditures, which clearly depend on the individuals’ 
responsibility or behavior, such as smoking or skiing accidents. For example, 
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individuals may be more inclined to subsidize for Viagra for somebody with 
an erectile dysfunction due to a spinal cord injury resulting from a traffic 
accident, than for someone with an erectile dysfunction due to excessive 
smoking. Skiing accidents may require the use of several health care services 
(i.e. transportation from the ski run to the hospital), whose consumption by 
skiers may generate no or little external effect on non-skiers.  
All in all, the greater a consumer’s responsibility in originating a condition is, 
the less would the use of services satisfy altruistic preferences, and thereby 
the lower an individual’s utility to support cross-subsidization for the 
consumption of the services. In practice, however, it may be difficult to prove 
the connection between someone’s responsibility and health care 
consumption. And, even if so, it may be practically unfeasible to set-up a 




3.1.2. Egoistic preferences 
Externalities generated by the individual’s (non-)consumption of health care 
services may be the consequence of egoistic preferences. For instance, 
individual B may be concerned about the use of medical care by individual A 
simply for egoistic reasons such as in the case of communicable diseases. The 
interpersonal utility functions for B looks like the following:  
 UB= UB (HB [MB, HA (MA)], CB) 
 
The medical consumption of A (MA), for example in the form of vaccination, 
reduces the chances that A gets a communicable disease and improves, in that 
way, the health of A (HA). However, because of the existence of a chance that 
B will also be infected by A (external effect), this has an influence on the 
(expected) health of B (HB), and thereby on B’s utility UB. In general, 
immunization for communicable diseases yields a positive utility for all non-
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immunized individuals.16 This externality limits itself to the use of few health 
care services, for which there is a divergence between collective and 
individual benefits or costs of consumption (Schut and Lapre’, 1988; Schut, 
1995). Suppose that the full cost of immunization is borne by each consumer 
then the risk of underconsumption is likely to occur, that is individuals may 
purchase less of these services than the socially optimal level.17 In fact, 
rational consumers would purchase goods until the ratio of the marginal 
utility of each to its price is equal across all goods. Therefore, when there is a 
positive consumption externality, the collective marginal utility is greater 
than that of the individual, so that (some) consumers, acting on their own and 
relying on their own resources, will not buy a large enough quantity of such 
goods (Rice, 2003). The risk of underconsumption is higher for low-income 
individuals, because high-income people have higher opportunity costs of 
getting medical care and lower marginal utility of money. In the case of a 
positive externality, a straightforward way to overcome underconsumption is 
to introduce subsidies.18 If a large number of people benefits from the 
subsidies, as it appears to be the case for immunizations, it is very likely that 
most individuals would also be willing to participate in a system of subsidies. 
Another consumption externality in health care is the presence of individuals’ 
concern about their own status relative to others. Therefore, individuals’ 
utility depends not so much on what they have in absolute terms but relative 
to others (Rice, 2003). Most plausible, perhaps, would be that people want 
those who have less than they have to have more (altruistic preferences) and, 
                                                
16 Similarly, effective preventive care may generate positive externalities. The consumption of 
effective preventive care may constitute a net gain for society as a whole, since it may reduce 
the chance of using more costly curative services in the future. This holds true if society pays 
for the future costs of curative services. 
17 The demand for preventive care is likely to be less than socially optimal because of the fact 
that moral hazard results in a substitution away from preventive care toward curative care 
(Pauly, 1974). The gains from preventive care are uncertain and occur in the future, while the 
costs (in terms of money and time) have to be made in advance. By contrast, curative care 
often offers a short-term and more certain gain. Therefore, the stronger the individual’s 
asymmetry with respect to uncertainty surrounding gains and losses, the less likely the 
person will demand preventive care (Fuchs, 1982).   
 17
at the same time, want to have as much as those who have more (concern 
about status or rank). Yet economists usually assume that utility is a function 
of an individual’s endowment, independent of his relative position. The 
importance of relative standing, or positional externalities, has a long history 
in economic theoretical (Veblen, 1899; Duesenberry, 1949; Galbraith, 1958) and 
empirical analysis (Duncan, 1976; Kapteyn et. al., 1985; Neumark, 1993; 
Easterlin, 1995). Positional19 externalities occur when “one person’s action 
alters an important frame of reference for others’ ” (Frank, 1991). People care 
about their relative position in society for many reasons. One of these reasons 
might be that people feel envy when others have things that they themselves 
do not possess. Envy may create distortions in individuals’ utility functions 
and its presence raises important policy questions (Frank, 1985; Bannerjee, 
1990; Elster, 1991; Choi, 1993).20 For example, the use of cosmetic treatments 
such as facelifts by some individuals may result in a reduction of the utility 
for the others since their look may be no longer as appealing. Then society’s 
marginal utility from the consumption of cosmetic treatments will be lower 
than the individual marginal utility of the facelifts’ users. Moreover, the 
concern for great relative physical attractiveness can lead everyone to expend 
resources simply to remain in the same relative position (Wolf, 1991). 
Therefore, including cosmetic surgery (or similar services) within the basic 
basket, may lower the cost borne by individuals, due to cross-subsidies, 
increase the quantity of services consumed and enlarge the deadweight loss.  
In order to increase social welfare and correct for this external effect, 
                                                                                                                                       
18 For instance, governments may enforce a system of earmarked income-related (from high 
to low income groups) cross-subsidies, or subsidize the provision of immunizations, even 
providing them free of charge. 
19 The term ‘positional’ has not been applied uniformly in the literature. For instance, 
positional goods were initially defined, by Hirsch (1976), as those that are in fixed supply or 
subject to congestion with increased use. 
20 Solnick et. al. (1998) attempt to identify what things create positional externalities and when 
people may find themselves on a positional treadmill. In other words, they try to answer the 
question: to what extent are positional externalities imposed when I have e.g. cosmetic 
surgery? They found that positional concerns are extremely important for physical 
attractiveness and stronger for goods than for bads. 
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governments could introduce taxation or leave these benefits out of the basic 




3.2. The financial risk of becoming a high risk 
The individuals’ risk of incurring high medical costs for future health 
problems may constitute a second argument for governments to establish a 
system of cross-subsidies. In particular, the occurrence of catastrophic risks or 
long-term chronic illnesses, such as AIDS, cancer, senile dementia, heart 
disease, or organ failure may cause dramatic increases in health expenditures, 
which are likely to be unbearable by most individuals. The problem faced by 
consumers, in particular low-income individuals, is that of obtaining lifetime 
insurance for this type of risks/illnesses (Newhouse, 1984; Diamond, 1992; 
Pauly, 1992; Cochrane, 1995).  
In real-world markets, however, insurance against the financial risk of 
becoming a high risk is incomplete. Therefore, individuals lose welfare ex 
ante, since they want insurance against the risk of falling into a worse risk 
class but they cannot obtain it. More precisely, the welfare loss derives from a 
missing market for insurance against the chance of being discovered to be 
high risk. This problem has been termed the problem of renewable insurance 
or the problem of intertemporal insurance (Cutler et. al., 2000).  
In order to correct for this market failure, government intervention may be 
required.21 In particular, by establishing a system of cross-subsidies that 
increases the financial access for high-risk and/or low-income groups to 
health care services, governments guarantee that risk-averse consumers are 
insured against long-term health risks (i.e. dramatic and unforeseen future 
                                                
21 In theory, markets might develop to deal with the problem posed by lifetime insurance. For 
a careful review of the main reasons suggesting that market solutions (e.g. long-term 
insurance, time-consistent insurance contracts) may be poor vehicles for insuring long-term 
health risks, we refer to Cutler et. al., 2000.  
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changes in health status).22 In this sense a cross-subsidy system also provides 
insurance against the financial risk of becoming a high risk in the future (van 




3.3. Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard may arise along several dimensions.23 In general, moral hazard 
problems refer to adverse behaviors encouraged by the guarantee of financial 
protection (i.e. subsidies) against losses caused by the occurrence of adverse 
events (Gruber, 2005). Since subsidies may reduce the marginal cost of basic 
health care services borne by the individual, they may result in excessive 
consumption of these services (‘consumer-initiated moral hazard’).24 
Providers may also be inclined to induce additional demand for services of 
which they know that the costs are covered by subsidies (‘supplier-induced 
moral hazard’), such as basic services.  
The problem of moral hazard or subsidies-induced overconsumption is not 
uniform across health care services. In particular, the extent to which cross-
subsidies induce moral hazard depends on the service’s demand price-
elasticity and on the interactions between basic and supplementary services. 
The higher is a service’s demand price-elasticity the greater is the subsidies-
induced overconsumption. For instance, the moral hazard effect of cross-
subsidizing lung-transplants may be much smaller than cross-subsidizing 
Viagra. In fact, the number of lung-transplants users may be much smaller 
                                                
22 After all, the traditional function of insurance is to protect against an adverse event that has 
not yet occurred (Arrow, 1963). 
23 Moral hazard problems are particularly relevant to the health care sector as contrasted with 
other sectors, because they emerge from the unequal distribution of information between the 
parties involved. Insurers and governments have highly imperfect information about the 
appropriateness of medical diagnoses and treatments. Hence, it is very difficult for them to 
value the damage caused by a disease and to appraise the costs of treatment. Moreover, they 
cannot judge whether or not subscribers have taken action to prevent diseases from 
occurring, which make it hard to relate premiums and subsidies to subscribers’ preventive 
activities (Schut, 1995). 
24 Moreover, individuals may reduce preventive activities to protect health status if they are 
(to some extent) financially protected against adverse events.  
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than Viagra consumers and is not likely to vary as much in case of cross-
subsidization. In other words, the moral hazard effect of cross-subsidizing 
lung-transplants seems to be smaller than cross-subsidizing Viagra, because 
the demand price-elasticity of lung-transplants is likely to be smaller than 
Viagra’s. Ceteris paribus, the smaller is the moral hazard effect of cross-
subsidizing a specific service, the stonger may be the governments’ 
arguments to enforce a system of cross-subsidies that guarantees the financial 
access to that service. 
We envisage two main interactions between basic and supplementary services 
that may be relevant for governments’ decision of establishing a system of 
cross-subsidies to increase the financial access to medical care. Firstly, by 
removing services from the basic basket that are complementary (i.e. 
prescription drugs) to remaining basic services (i.e.  GP care), the 
consumption of both subsidized (basic) and non-subsidized (supplementary) 
services may be reduced. In particular, the price increase resulting by the 
exclusion of complementary services from subsidization reduces the 
consumers’ demand for these supplementary services, and thereby induces a 
decrease in the demand of basic services (i.e. negative cross price-elasticities). 
On the other hand, including complementary services in the basic basket may 
induce moral hazard in terms of excessive consumption of basic services, 
since price is reduced by cross-subsidization. To the extent that the decrease 
(increase) in the consumption of basic services is not socially optimal, the 
exclusion (inclusion) of complementary services from (in) the basic basket 
may lead to a welfare loss for society. So, complementary services involve a 
tradeoff between access to basic services and moral hazard. 
A second important interaction may occur if cheap substitutes (i.e. OTC 
drugs) of remaining basic services are removed from the basic basket. 
Depending on the type of service, the removal of relatively cheap substitutes 
may induce a substitution effect towards the remaining more expensive basic 
services. If the total cost (including the subsidy) of basic services would 
exceed the cost of these substitutes, this substitution effect may imply a 
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welfare loss for society. On the other hand, the inclusion in the basic basket of 
cheaper substitutes, which may be accessed by most individuals without 
excessive financial burden, may increase moral hazard. So, the substitution 
effect induced by a system of cross-subsidization leads to a trade-off between 
cost-effective substitution and moral hazard. 
All in all, cross-subsidization may induce moral hazard problems, which 
consist of excessive, and thereby suboptimal, consumption of services 
included in the basic basket. Moral hazard may also lead to health care costs’ 
inflation.25 So, to the extent that a system of cross-subsidization increases the 
incentives for excessive consumption of health care services, there is a trade-
off between access to care and moral hazard. Therefore, when deciding 
whether to include specific services in the basic basket policy makers have to 
be aware of the financial consequences of subsidies-induced overconsumption 




4. Categorizing coverage in mandatory and voluntary 
Coverage, that provides financial access to predefined health care services, 
may be particularly beneficial for those at the lower end of the income 
distribution (Nyman, 2003). However, it is those at the lower end of the 
income distribution who are most likely not to take out coverage voluntarily 
(Feldstein, 1999). Governments may stimulate the voluntary purchase of 
coverage by subsidizing it. In addition or in alternative, governments may 
impose on consumers a legal obligation to obtain coverage. In this section, the 
                                                
25 In particular, subsidies-induced overconsumption by increasing the costs of a specific 
service may negatively affect the cost-effectiveness ratio of that service. In many countries 
(e.g. France, The Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, ect.) policy-makers have in some 
circumstances taken into account the ex-post cost-effectiveness ratio in deciding whether or 
not to subsidize a service. For instance, cost-effective treatments with a high ex-post cost-
effective ratio (e.g. selective serotonin reuptake (SSRIs), sildenafil (Viagra) ect.) were 
(partially) removed from the basic basket. On the other end, treatments not considered cost-
effective (e.g. ultra-orphan drugs) were subsidized because of their low ex-post impact on the 
budget available for cross-subsidies (Harris et. al., 2001; Kooijman et. al., 2003; Hughes et. al., 
2005).    
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following economic arguments for governments to enforce mandatory 
coverage are discussed: free riding (section 4.1.), lack of foresight (section 4.2.) 




4.1. Free riding 
In general, any investment in goods or services that has a personal cost but a 
common benefit may provide incentives for individuals to underinvest, or to 
invest less than is socially optimal (free rider problem). In this context, free 
riders are individuals who may not voluntarily purchase socially optimal 
levels of coverage, given that they expect not to be denied access to medical 
treatments in case of need. The availability of services financed by others 
reduces an individual’s demand for coverage primarily because it removes 
the health consequences (i.e. disutility) of being uncovered. If governments do 
not impose any legal mandate to cover for predefined health care services, 
individuals may have incentives to free ride.  
An individual’s incentives and opportunities to free ride may not be 
homogeneous across different income groups. Suppose that the full cost of 
coverage for predefined health care services is borne by each individual and 
                                                
26 In the literature, adverse selection is often advocated as another argument for governments 
to introduce mandatory coverage (Nyman, 2003). Adverse selection arises when individuals 
can estimate their expected costs (or risk) more accurately than the insurer. Insurers can 
counteract adverse selection by trying to obtain information about the applicants’ risk, by 
differentiating the level of coverage to prompt applicants to signal their risk, or by excluding 
some risks from coverage. These strategies may result in unaffordable high premiums and 
partial or even absent coverage for specific risk groups. Due to this partial market failure the 
potential social welfare gain from risk protection cannot be fully realized (e.g. in the US about 
40 million people are uninsured). The government can avoid the adverse selection induced 
welfare loss from inadequate protection by making coverage compulsory. In the presence of 
mandatory coverage low-risk individuals are prevented from opting out of a pooling 
equilibrium. But compulsion may generate other welfare losses, i.e. moral hazard. Alternative 
and less invasive measures deal with adverse selection while maintaining adequate risk 
protection for all risk groups. The central idea is to require insurers to offer adequate 
coverage to all applicants, irrespective of risk, while keeping premiums affordable by means 
of some system to redistribute purchasing power for medical care (Schut, 1995). For instance, 
governments may introduce a system of (risk-related) cross-subsidies financed via mandatory 
solidarity contributions which may increase the affordability and sustainability of coverage 
for high risks.  
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that access to services is not denied to individuals’ without coverage, then the 
risk of undercoverage may occur. In particular, incentives to free ride increase 
the lower an individual’s available income, because the lower the income the 
higher the marginal utility of money. In fact, rational consumers purchase 
goods until the ratio of the marginal utility of each to its price is equal across 
all goods. Therefore, money saved on not purchasing coverage for health care 
services may be spent on other goods or services (e.g. food and clothing). 
Hence, low-income individuals could purposely not cover for health care 
services because others in society are willing to pay for them if they really 
need health care.27 For high-income people this argument is less relevant 
because they can (and therefore will have to) pay most health care services 
themselves. Mandatory coverage also for high-income individuals may be 
relevant for catastrophic risks with very high expected medical care costs. In 
fact, the more catastrophic are health risks the greater are the costs of 
coverage, and thereby the stronger the incentives for purchasing suboptimal 




4.2. Lack of foresight 
Another argument for governments to enforce mandatory coverage may be 
based on the concept of individuals’ myopic behaviour, implying that 
individuals do not appropriately cover themselves against health risks. In 
other words, individuals may fail to maximize their (life-time) utility. For 
instance, this may mean that consumers feel healthy and underestimate health 
risks, i.e. young and healthy individuals do not always know what is in their 
best interest. Individuals may not correctly appreciate how much certain 
health care services are for their own benefit or for the benefit of their 
                                                
27 Individuals at the low end of the income distribution may rely on last resort safety nets (e.g. 
charity), which stand ready to cover for health care services in the event of illness. Empirical 
studies show that the presence of last resort safety nets, such as charity, reduces the demand 
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dependents.28 Such short-sightedness may lead people to make wrong 
judgements about the relative importance of certain and direct benefits (i.e. no 
payments for coverage) compared to uncertain costs. A theoretical 
explanation to this phenomenon is that individuals’ aversion toward risk is 
not symmetric, since they appear to prefer certain to uncertain gains but 
prefer uncertain to certain losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Therefore, the 
stronger the individual’s asymmetry with respect to uncertainty, the less 
likely the person will voluntarily demand for coverage.  
Individuals’ lack of foresight may have serious consequences for individuals 
and society. In fact, the immediate financial advantage of not paying for 
coverage may lead to high future expenses, which may be nearly or totally 
impossible to sustain by individuals. In order to prevent individuals from 
becoming uninsurable and having unaffordable high health expenditures, 
government intervention may be required in the form of mandatory coverage. 
For high-income people this argument is less relevant (although not irrelevant 
in case of catastrophic health care expenditures) than for low-income people 
because on average they are better educated and can afford high health 
expenditures.  
Ceteris paribus, the more serious health risks are, the greater the impact of 
individuals’ lack of foresight may be on health expenditures, and thereby the 





4.3. Transaction costs 
Mandatory coverage, also for the high-income people, can be justified if the 
transaction costs of organizing otherwise a system of cross-subsidies 
                                                                                                                                       
for coverage, because they remove the health consequences of being uncovered (Thomas, 
1994/5; Cutler et. al., 1996; Dubay et. al., 1997, Holahan, 1997; Johnson et. al., 2000). 
28 We refer, for example, to psycho-geriatric care, to the use of dental care by children, to the 
contraceptive pill for girls under 18 years old, to long-term psychiatric care, to obstetric care, 
to long-term nursing home care and to care for persons addicted to alcohol and drugs (van de 
Ven, 1995). 
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(=solidarity) are relatively high. The realization of a system of cross-subsidies 
involves for example the costs of administering and monitoring the collection 
of mandatory contributions (e.g. taxes) and the redistribution of subsidies to 
high-risk or low-income individuals. In case these costs are too high for 
Society, governments may introduce mandatory coverage for basic services 
for everyone (i.e. including high-income people). On the other hand, 
mandatory health insurance may induce moral hazard and increase total 
health care costs, and thereby constitute a welfare loss for society as a whole. 
So to the extent that a system of cross-subsidies induces high transaction 
costs, Society may face a trade-off between moral hazard and transaction costs 




5. Summary and conclusions 
This contribution investigates the economic rationales for the design of health 
care financing arrangements. It proposes a categorization of financing 
schemes based on a distinction between basic and supplementary services 
and between mandatory and voluntary coverage. The most important 
economic arguments for governments to enforce a system of cross-subsidies 
that guarantees the financial access to a predefined set of basic services to 
high-risk or low-income individuals are the presence of externalities in health 
care services consumption; the individuals’ risk of becoming bad risks; and 
the moral hazard effects induced by cross-subsidization. In addition, the 
rationale for mandatory coverage is based on considerations of free riding 
behaviour, individuals’ lack of foresight and too high transaction costs of 
alternative ways to organize cross-subsidies. 
The following summary tables 2a & 2b present an overview in which the sign 
and direction of each economic factor is related to the choice 
basic/supplementary services and the choice mandatory/voluntary coverage.  













Table 2a. Economic arguments for categorizing services as basic  
     (supplementary). 
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Table 2b. Economic arguments for categorizing coverage as mandatory  
      (voluntary). 
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Policy makers may weight the effects of the different factors when deciding 
whether a service may be classified as basic or supplementary, and whether 
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